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1045 
A Record of What? 
The Proper Scope of an Administrative 
Record for Informal Agency Action 
 
Peter Constable Alter* 
Recent cases involving controversial actions taken by federal agencies under the Trump 
Administration have highlighted a preliminary procedural nuance unique to litigation under 
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA): the “administrative record.” The APA 
provides for liberal judicial review of federal agency actions, but limits that review to the “whole 
record, or those parts of it cited by a party.” This “record rule” limits judicial review to the 
“administrative record” before the agency when it made the decision at issue. The APA defines 
the administrative record for agency action subject to its formal procedural requirements, but 
leaves open the question of what an administrative record consists of for informal agency action 
not subject to those procedural requirements but nevertheless subject to judicial review. 
Lower courts, without definitive statutory text, legislative history, or Supreme Court 
precedent for guidance, have developed a divergent and sometimes inconsistent body of case law 
addressing the proper scope of an administrative record for informal agency action. The 
traditional approach generally would focus on those materials directly considered by the agency 
decisionmaker alone while categorically excluding most, if not all, internal documents. But 
more recently, some lower courts have begun to apply an expansive construction of the record 
rule, requiring agencies subject to litigation to submit any material considered by agency 
personnel involved in the decision-making process, including an array of internal materials. 
Two recent cases, involving the Department of Homeland Security’s attempted revocation of 
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and Secretary of Commerce 
Wilbur Ross’s attempts to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Department of Commerce, 
illustrate the wider movement towards an expansive construction of the record rule for informal 
agency action. 
In this Note, I argue that the expansive approach to the record rule for informal agency 
action becoming popular in some lower courts is correct, both in terms of the judicial review 
provisions of the APA it serves and the principles of administrative law the APA furthers. 
 
* J.D., University of California, Irvine School of Law, 2019. Many thanks to the editors and 
executive board of the UC Irvine Law Review for their diligent work, to Professor Shauhin Talesh and 
my colleagues in the Advanced Writing for Law Journals workshop for their thoughtful feedback, and 
to Professor Michael Robinson-Dorn for never failing to indulge a conversation about  
administrative law. 
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The broader adoption of an expansive approach to the record rule has implications for any 
area of law touched by federal agencies. Indeed, as the DACA and 2020 Census litigation 
demonstrate, the composition of an administrative record can have significant consequences for 
issues of national importance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Trump Administration is no stranger to controversies. Many of these 
controversies, indeed some of the most contentious, involve the actions of  
Trump-appointed Officials in federal agencies. The Administration’s decisions to 
rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and add a 
question about citizenship to the 2020 Census are two of the most noteworthy 
examples, which various stakeholders have since challenged in federal court. In the 
case of DACA, the University of California, among others, brought suit against 
Acting Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) Elaine Duke in September 2017, 
alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et 
seq. (2012) (APA), and seeking to enjoin the DHS from rescinding DACA.1 
Similarly, in the case of the 2020 Census, numerous states, cities, and counties, the 
District of Columbia, and the United States Conference of Mayors, brought suit 
against Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross in April 2018, alleging violations of the 
APA and seeking to enjoin the Department of Commerce from including the 
citizenship question in the 2020 census.2 
These two cases have highlighted an overlooked preliminary issue unique to 
APA litigation: the “administrative record.” The APA standardizes “the procedures 
by which federal agencies are accountable to the public,”3 and provides for liberal 
 
1. See Complaint, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:17-cv-05211 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017). The claim also names the Department of Homeland Security as a defendant, 
alleges constitutional violations, and seeks declaratory relief. Id. In this Article, I will use “the DACA 
litigation” or “the DACA case” to refer to this matter collectively. 
2. See Complaint, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 1:18-cv-02921 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2018). 
3. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992). 
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judicial review of federal agency actions,4 “creat[ing] a comprehensive remedial 
scheme for those allegedly harmed by agency action.”5 However, the APA limits 
judicial review of agency action to “the whole record, or those parts of it cited by a 
party.”6 Under Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, this “record rule”7 limits 
judicial review to the “administrative record that was before the [decisionmaker] at 
the time he [or she] made his [or her] decision.”8 As such, in APA cases the 
administrative record is “the focal point for judicial review,”9 with traditional 
discovery unavailable outside of extreme circumstances.10 
However, as Judge Furman rankled in Department of Commerce, “the term 
‘administrative record’ is not particularly helpful in clarifying the proper object of 
judicial review.”11 That is especially true where the challenged agency action is 
“informal”—that is, the action is not subject to the APA’s more formal procedural 
provisions, which provide guidance for what would be included in an administrative 
record.12 Indeed, informal agency actions are the sort at issue in the DACA litigation 
and Department of Commerce. Courts and commentators generally agree that the 
APA’s text and legislative history sheds minimal light on the record rule as it should 
apply to informal agency action13 and the Supreme Court has not helped matters, 
providing essentially no guidance as to the proper scope of the administrative record 
for informal agency action outside of the above quote from Overton Park. This has 
led to a disjointed and inconsistent body of case law as lower courts develop their 
own theories of the proper scope of an administrative record.14 
Traditionally, lower courts would apply a narrow construction of the record 
rule, defining the whole administrative record for informal agency action to include 
primarily external documents submitted to the agency and considered directly by 
the agency decisionmaker, excluding most if not all internal documents and 
communications.15 But more recently, some district courts have begun to apply an 
 
4. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967) (the APA’s “‘generous review 
provisions’ must be given a hospitable interpretation”), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430  
U.S. 99 (1977). 
5. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 819 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016). 
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). 
7. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y. v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1997). 
8. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
9. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). 
10. See Bos. Redevelopment Auth. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 838 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(“additional discovery may on rare occasions be proper in an APA case”); Cmty. for Creative  
Non-Violence v. Lujan, 908 F.2d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Overton Park allows discovery of the 
agency decisionmaking process only in two circumstances.”). 
11. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
12. See 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:27 (3d ed. 2010). 
13. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 631 (“[T]he term ‘administrative record’ 
is not particularly helpful in clarifying the proper object of judicial review.”); Aram A. Gavoor & Steven 
A. Platt, Administrative Records and the Courts, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2018). 
14. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 4–45; see infra Part III. 
15. See, e.g., Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 163 F.2d 689, 693  
(D.C. Cir. 1947) (“Briefs, and memoranda made by the Commission or its staff, are not parts of the 
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expansive reading of the record rule in reviewing informal agency action. These 
courts define the administrative record to include any materials considered by 
agency personnel involved in the decision-making process (not just the ultimate 
decisionmaker), including “internal comments, draft reports, inter- or intra-agency 
emails, revisions, memoranda, or meeting notes [that] inform an agency’s final 
decision.”16 They also require the agency produce formal privilege logs 
documenting any assertion of privilege for withheld documents.17 Judges Furman 
and Alsup adopted similarly expansive readings of the record rule in their 
preliminary rulings in Department of Commerce and the DACA  
litigation respectively.18 
In this Note, I argue in favor of the expansive construction of the record rule 
becoming popular with some district courts reviewing informal agency action. In 
lieu of definitive statutory text or legislative history, I explain the proper scope of 
an administrative record for informal agency action with reference to the APA’s 
broader scheme, specifically the judicial review provisions the record rule serves.19 
I begin, in Part I, by providing an overview of the relevant provisions of the APA. 
In doing so, I define informal agency action and describe the APA’s judicial review 
provisions, paying particular attention to the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review that applies to informal agency action and requires such action be the 
product of “reasoned decisionmaking.”20 In Part II, I describe the evolution of the 
administrative record concept, expounding on the divergent case law and identifying 
the key areas of dispute. Then, in Part III, I argue that the expansive construction 
of the administrative record illustrated by Department of Commerce and the DACA 
litigation is correct, both in terms of what is required for meaningful judicial review 
of informal agency action and in terms of the administrative law principles that 
underlie the APA. 
The DACA litigation puts a fine point on the stakes. Is the administrative 
record for an agency action revoking legal protection for 800,000 people simply 256 
 
[administrative] record.”); Does 1-72 v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. CV 15-273 (CKK), 
2016 WL 10771344, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2016); Oceana, Inc. v. Pritzker, 217 F. Supp. 3d 310, 318 
(D.D.C. 2016); Fund for Animals v. Williams, 391 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 2005). 
16.  Inst. for Fisheries Res. v. Burwell, No. 16-cv-01574-VC, 2017 WL 89003, at *1  
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2017); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Mnuchin, No. 3:17-CV-1930-B, 2018 WL 
4103724, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2018); S.F. Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm’n v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, No. 16-cv-05420-RS( JCS), 2018 WL 3846002, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2018); Sierra Club 
v. Zinke, No. 17-cv-07187-WHO, 2018 WL 3126401, at *4–45 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2018); Indigenous 
Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. CV-17-29-GF-BMM, 2018 WL 1796217, at *4–45  
(D. Mont. Apr. 16, 2018); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. 15-cv-01590-HSG(KAW), 2017 WL 
1709318, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2017); California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,  
No. C05-03508 EDL, 2006 WL 708914, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2006). 
17. See supra note 16. 
18. See infra Part II.C. 
19. See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (“[I]nterpret the relevant words not 
in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context, structure . . . and purpose.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
20. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011). 
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pages of fourteen publicly available documents?21 The current DHS would have you 
believe so.22 Or, is that administrative record the emails, letters, memoranda, notes, 
media items, opinions, and other materials considered by the Acting Secretary and 
her subordinates in the process of making the determination to revoke those legal 
protections? This Note argues that it must be the latter because that allows courts 
to fulfill their obligation under the APA to ensure federal agencies engaged in 
reasoned decision-making, with implications for any area of law involving agency  
action—from immigration, to telecommunications,23 healthcare,24 employment,25 
environmental protection,26 land use,27 Native American affairs,28 and agriculture.29 
I. INFORMAL AGENCY ACTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA 
In this Part, I provide an overview of the APA’s relevant provisions as context 
for understanding the proper scope of the administrative record for an informal 
agency action. I begin by defining informal agency action, which can only be done 
by contrasting it with the formal agency actions prescribed by the APA’s procedural 
provisions. Then, I describe the standard of review applicable to informal agency 
under the APA’s judicial review provisions. In doing so, I demonstrate that although 
informal agency actions are (by definition) exempt from the APA’s formal 
procedural provisions, they are nevertheless subject to a minimum procedural 
requirement under its judicial review provisions, which requires that even informal 
agency action must be the product of an agency’s “reasoned decisionmaking.”30 
A. Agency Action: Formal and Informal 
Put simply, an informal agency action is one that is not subject to the APA’s 
formal procedural provisions.31 Thus, even though this Note is focused on informal 
 
21. See In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, and judgment 
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017). 
22. See id. 
23. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. F.C.C., 524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
24. See, e.g., Dana-Farber Cancer Inst. v. Hargan, 878 F.3d 336 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
25. See, e.g., McNeely v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 720 F. App’x 825 (9th Cir. 2017). 
26. See, e.g., Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2015). 
27. See e.g., Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561  
(D. Mont. 2018), order amended and supplemented, 369 F. Supp. 3d 1045 (D. Mont. 2018), appeal 
dismissed and remanded sub nom. Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 18-36068, 2019 
WL 2542756 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019). 
28. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 819 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2016). 
29. See, e.g., Ctr. for Food Safety v. Perdue, 320 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal 
dismissed, No. 18-16378, 2018 WL 5304837 (9th Cir. 2018); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack,  
No. 15-CV-01590-HSG (KAW), 2017 WL 1709318, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2017). 
30. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011). 
31. See 3 KOCH, supra note 12, § 8:27 (“In the vernacular of administrative law, an ‘informal’ 
action is one that is not subject to a closed, well-defined record. Thus, under the APA, ‘formal’  
(a/k/a ‘on the record’ or ‘trial-type’) actions are precisely those that are subject to the APA’s statutory 
definition of the ‘record.’ The residual category of ‘informal’ agency action includes everything else. 
Thus, even though notice-and-comment rulemaking has, in the decades since the APA was adopted in 
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agency action, I must take a brief detour and describe those sorts of formal agency 
action that are subject to the APA’s formal procedural provisions in order to define 
informal agency action as the remainder. 
The APA provides a formal procedural framework for some sorts of agency 
action. The APA’s procedural provisions, codified 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., do so by 
first distinguishing “rulemakings” from “adjudications.” A rulemaking is the 
“agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”32 A rule, in turn, 
“means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular 
availability and future effect.”33 In contrast, an adjudication is essentially a  
case-by-case determination, typically the application of a statute or rule to a 
particular circumstance.34 The APA provides formal procedural requirements for 
both, which results in something akin to an evidentiary hearing for rulemakings35 
and something akin to a court trial in front of agency officials or an administrative 
law judge for adjudications.36 
However, the APA only mandates an agency follow these formal procedures 
where Congress requires the agency to do so by using certain triggering language in 
the underlying statute. An agency must follow formal rulemaking procedures only 
“[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for 
an agency hearing.”37 And an agency must follow formal adjudication procedures 
only when an adjudication is “required by statute to be determined on the record 
after an opportunity for an agency hearing.”38 Thus, without doing so explicitly, the 
APA creates distinction between “formal agency action” (agency action subject to 
 
1946, become encrusted with procedures and impact statements, it is still, counter-intuitively perhaps, 
a species of ‘informal’ agency action under the original APA framework. The vast majority of agency 
adjudications are not subject to a formal record requirement and thus also ‘informal’ in this sense.”). 
32. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2018). 
33. Id. § 551(4). 
34.  Under § 551(7), an adjudication is an “agency process for formulating an order.” Id. § 551(7). 
An order, in turn, “means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, 
injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making.” Id. § 551(6). 
35. See generally id. §§ 553, 556, 557. 
36.  § 554(b) provides that persons entitled to an agency hearing must receive notice of “the 
time, place, and nature of the hearing,” “the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is 
to be held,” and “the matters of fact and law asserted.” Id. § 554(b). In the event the parties are unable 
to resolve the matter at issue by consent, § 556 and § 557 provide for trial-like hearings and  
decision-making, appealable to the agency head. If, however, the relevant statute does not trigger formal 
adjudication procedures, the APA does not subject the agency to a specific procedural regime. Id. §§ 
556, 557. 
37. Id. § 553(c) (2018). Although a statute in theory need not use the precise wording of § 553(c) 
to trigger formal rulemaking procedures, see United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224,  
238–46 (1973), the precise phrasing is “virtually . . . a touchstone test.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
38. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2018). This language is not quite the “virtual touchstone” as for formal 
rulemaking, see supra note 37, but courts prefer not to invoke these procedural requirements without a 
clear expression of Congress’s intent to that effect, particularly where the agency does not interpret the 
relevant hearing requirement to trigger formal adjudication procedures. See Dominion Energy Brayton 
Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2006). 
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the APA’s formal procedural requirements) and “informal agency action” (agency 
action not subject to the APA’s formal procedural requirements). Courts and 
scholars alike have widely adopted this parlance.39 
Following the APA’s rulemaking/adjudication framework, informal agency 
action can be understood as encompassing informal rulemakings and informal 
adjudications. Informal rulemakings include (1) rulemakings subject to the APA’s 
less stringent “notice and comment” requirements and (2) rulemakings entirely 
exempt from the APA’s procedural provisions.40 
Notice and comment procedures are the default procedural regime for 
rulemakings.41 However, the APA exempts from its notice and comment 
requirements those rulemakings that result in “interpretative rules, general 
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”42 Such 
rulemakings are not subject to the APA’s procedural provisions at all. 
For adjudications, the APA provides no intermediate procedural regime.43 
Thus, an informal adjudication is simply one not subject to the APA’s formal 
adjudication procedures. Given the APA’s emphasis on standardized administrative 
procedure, it might be easy to assume that formal agency action dominates the 
workings of federal agencies. However, while this may once have been true, the vast 
majority of agency action is now of the informal sort.44 This includes innocuous 
activities such as the Forest Service’s approval of a campfire permit for a National 
Forest but also agency actions with significant consequences for millions of 
Americans. For example, the Obama administration promulgated DACA and the 
related Deferred Action of Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
as general statements of policy (informal rules), and the Trump DHS has attempted 
 
39. See supra note 31. 
40. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018). 
41. § 553 provides the procedural requirements for notice and comment rulemaking. Id. § 553. 
As the name suggests, under § 553, an agency must provide notice of a proposed rule, typically by 
publishing it in the Federal Register. Id. The notice must describe the “time, place, and nature of the 
public rule making proceeding,” reference the “legal authority under which the rule is proposed,” and 
provide an adequate description of the proposed rule. Id. Then, the agency must provide an opportunity 
for comment, whereby “interested persons” may submit “written data, views, or arguments.” Id. The 
agency must consider the comments and in publishing the final rule, provide a “concise general 
statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose.” Id. 
42. Id. § 553(b)(A). 
43. Id. 
44. More popular at the time of the APA’s enactment, formal rulemakings in particular have 
fallen out of favor due to the burdensome procedural requirements. The classic example of formal 
rulemaking’s inefficiency is the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) proceedings for food labeling 
in the 1960s. Most notably, one such proceeding took more than ten years to determine what level of 
peanuts to require in peanut butter in order to “promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of 
consumers.” The FDA sought a 90% peanut requirement but was vehemently opposed by the peanut 
butter industry, which sought an 87% peanut requirement. See STEPHEN G. BREYER  
ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 505 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 8th  
ed. 2017). 
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to repeal DACA in the same manner.45 Likewise, the Department of Commerce’s 
decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census—which could have 
significant political ramifications—took place without a formal adjudication.46 
Environmentalists are familiar with land use permits that approve controversial uses 
of federal land such as the Keystone XL pipeline.47 Similarly, the Department of the 
Interior has implemented various controversial policies regarding Native American 
tribes through permitting and other informal actions.48 
Thus, though not subject to the APA’s formal procedural provisions, informal 
agency action plays a significant role in American life under the modern 
administrative state. However, federal agencies engaging in informal agency action 
are not entirely free from procedural limitations under the APA. Rather, as 
described in the next Section, the APA’s judicial review provisions, which apply to 
formal and informal agency action alike, require informal agency action be the 
product of the agency’s “reasoned decisionmaking.”49 
B. Judicial Review of Agency Action 
Unlike the APA’s procedural provisions, which only apply to certain types of 
agency action, the APA’s judicial review provisions, codified 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., 
apply to all forms of agency action, whether formal or informal.50 The APA 
provides a right of review to any party “suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action,” waiving the federal government’s sovereign immunity for non-damages 
claims brought against agencies and their officers.51 This language “embodies the 
basic presumption [in favor] of judicial review” for APA claims—“judicial review 
of . . . agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is 
persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.”52 Section 704, 
however, does limit judicial review to “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute 
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”53 
Nonetheless, the finality requirement is to be “interpreted in a ‘pragmatic’ and 
 
45. In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, and judgment 
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171–73 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an 
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (regarding DAPA). 
46.  See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
47. See e.g., Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 570–71  
(D. Mont. 2018) (permitting Keystone XL pipeline). 
48. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 819 F.3d 1084, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2016). 
49.  Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011). 
50. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2018) (judicial review provisions apply to administrative action except 
where statute precludes judicial review or the action is committed to agency discretion by law). 
51. Id. § 702. 
52. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). 
53. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018). 
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‘flexible’ manner”54 in order to give the APA’s “generous review  
provisions . . . hospitable interpretation.”55 
In contrast to this broad grant of reviewability stand the prescribed standards 
of review, which are narrow and deferential to the agency. Section 706 provides that 
“the reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions” upon finding the action meets any of six standards.56 The 
dominant standard, however—and the standard applied to the informal agency 
actions this Note is concerned with—requires the court to set aside an agency action 
upon finding it “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”57 
Application of the arbitrary and capricious standard has developed a robust 
body of case law, elaborating—though perhaps not clarifying—the structure of 
arbitrary and capricious review. Although arbitrary and capricious review “is to be 
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is 
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”58 However, 
“courts retain a role, and an important one, in ensuring that agencies have engaged 
in reasoned decisionmaking.”59 Thus, arbitrary and capricious review focuses on the 
agency’s decision-making, not the ultimate decision: 
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency 
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise.60 
 
54. Dietary Supplemental Coal., Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting 
Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149). 
55. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140–41 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
56. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). 
57. Id. This “arbitrary and capricious” standard operates as a catch-all, providing the default 
standard of review where none of the other, more limited standards apply. Ass’n of Data Processing 
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Scalia, J.). 
58. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
59. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011). 
60. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,  
44 (1983). 
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The doctrine has developed various branches to address changes in agency 
position,61 flawed legal reasoning,62 improper political motivation,63 and so forth. 
Ultimately, under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, “not only must 
an agency’s decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process 
by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational.”64 The agency must 
“articulate[ ] a rational basis for its decision,”65 and must provide a “rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.”66 Indeed, “the orderly 
 
61. F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009) (“[T]he requirement 
that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display 
awareness that it is changing position. . . . But it need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the 
reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is 
permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be 
better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates. This means that the agency need not 
always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank 
slate. Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict 
those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests 
that must be taken into account. It would be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters.”) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original). There is some debate as to whether agency changes of position are 
subject to a heightened standard of review. In Fox Television, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, is 
adamant that agency changes in position do not trigger any heightened standard of review. See id. at 514 
(“We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all 
agency change be subjected to more searching review. The Act mentions no such heightened standard. 
And our opinion in State Farm neither held nor implied that every agency action representing a policy 
change must be justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy in the first 
instance.”). This position is consistent with State Farm, which “fully recognize[d] that ‘regulatory 
agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever,’ and that an agency must be given ample 
latitude to ‘adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances.’” 463 U.S. at 42 
(1983). However, some Circuits still appear to apply a heightened standard to changes in agency policy. 
See Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To satisfy this requirement, the 
agency must provide not only a reasoned explanation for its current position, but also a reasoned 
explanation for why the change was warranted or why the new position is preferable.”) (collecting 
cases); see also Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 2015) (“There 
was a change in presidential administrations just days after the . . . Rule was promulgated in 2001. 
Elections have policy consequences. But, State Farm teaches that even when reversing a policy after an 
election, an agency may not simply discard prior factual findings without a reasoned explanation.”). 
62.  See, e.g., Safe Air for Everyone v. U.S. E.P.A., 488 F.3d 1088, 1101 (9th Cir. 2007) 
63. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43–44; see, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123, 1129, 
1134–35 (9th Cir.), opinion amended and superseded, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007). 
64. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998). 
65.  Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). 
66. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). Some courts 
describe this “reasoned decisionmaking” standard in terms of whether the agency has “taken a ‘hard 
look’ at the salient problems.” Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403  
U.S. 923 (1971)). However, there is some question as to whether the “hard look” language is 
appropriate. See Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 477 F.3d 668, 687 n.15 (9th  
Cir. 2007) (acknowledging usage of “hard look” but concluding: “Because the Supreme Court has never 
explicitly embraced the ‘hard look’ approach to judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of the APA, we adhere to the Supreme Court’s explicit guidance in State Farm that an agency 
must cogently explain its actions and demonstrate a rational connection between the facts it found and 
the choice it made.”) (citations omitted). But see 7 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., WEST’S FEDERAL 
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functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the 
administrative agency acted by clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.”67 
Accordingly, “[c]ourts . . . may not accept post hoc rationalizations for agency 
action . . . nor may they supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the 
agency itself has not given.”68 Moreover, as the Supreme Court confirmed in 
Department of Commerce, an agency action will be found arbitrary and capricious if it 
rests on a contrived, pretextual justification.69 
In short, the APA generally limits judicial review of agency action to the 
agency’s process for picking between reasonable policy choices, not the policy 
merits of the choice itself. Of course, the APA’s judicial review provisions provide 
one further limitation on the judicial review of agency action: the record rule, which 
I explore in Parts II and III. 
II. THE RECORD RULE 
This Part provides an overview of the record rule—the APA’s limit on judicial 
review of agency action to “the whole record, or those parts of it cited by a 
party”70—paying particular attention to its current application to informal agency 
action. First, I take a moment to describe the mechanics of disputing an 
administrative record in APA litigation. In doing so, my aim is to identify some key 
terms that will help clarify the muddled history and application of the record rule to 
informal agency action. Second, I provide an early history of the record rule, from 
its limited pre-APA roots to the post-APA Supreme Court cases that provide 
limited guidance as to its scope. Third, I describe the current state of the record 
rule, identifying areas of agreement but also the primary areas of dispute between 
agencies, private litigants, and the courts with regard to the proper scope of the 
administrative record for informal agency action. 
A. The Mechanics of Disputing an Administrative Record 
APA litigation is wrought with litigants’ attempts to get favorable evidence in 
front of the reviewing court, either as part of the administrative record, or through 
an exception to the record rule that allows the reviewing court to consider  
extra-record evidence.71 This has resulted in generally accepted—but frequently 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 8106 (“Without using the term [‘hard look’], the Supreme Court used 
the hard look approach in [State Farm].”). 
67. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). 
68. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1043  
(N.D. Cal.), aff’d sub nom., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 
(9th Cir. 2018); see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43–44 (“The reviewing court should not attempt itself 
to make up for such deficiencies: ‘We may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the 
agency itself has not given.’”), quoting, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
69. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019). 
70. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
71. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 16. 
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mislabeled—mechanisms by which the administrative record is presented and 
contested in APA litigation. 
After the plaintiff files a complaint alleging an APA violation, the defendant 
agency certifies and files with the court what it asserts to be the administrative 
record upon which the challenged action was based and judicial review is to 
consider.72 Although an “agency may not unilaterally determine what constitutes the 
Administrative Record,” the agency’s preparation and certification of the 
administrative record is subject to a “presumption of administrative regularity,”73 
which traditionally makes it difficult for a plaintiff to add materials favorable to its 
case.74 Unless the plaintiff is able to resolve any administrative record disputes with 
the agency informally,75 it is left with two options to get materials not included in 
the certified administrative record in front of the judge. 
First, the plaintiff could bring a “motion to complete” the administrative 
record with certain materials or categories of materials.76 This would involve arguing 
that the materials in question were properly a part of the administrative  
record—i.e., that the materials were a part of the record on which the agency based 
its decision. To be successful, the plaintiff would need to overcome the presumption 
of regularity, which requires a showing of “clear evidence to the contrary.”77 Such 
proof would include direct evidence that an agency decisionmaker considered the 
material question or a showing that the agency relied on an erroneous definition of 
the administrative record in compiling it.78 A successful motion to complete the 
administrative record results in a court order that the agency certify a new record 
including specified materials or categories of materials.79 
Second, the plaintiff could bring a “motion to supplement” the administrative 
record.80 This would involve arguing that even if the materials in question are not 
properly considered part of the administrative record (i.e., because they were not 
before the agency during the decision-making process), the materials fall within a 
recognized exception to the record rule such that the lower court should consider 
 
72. See Pac. Shores Subdivision, Cal. Water Dist. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 448  
F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2006); Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 11–13. 
73. Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739–40 (10th Cir. 1993) (“However, the 
designation of the Administrative Record, like any established administrative procedure, is entitled to a 
presumption of administrative regularity.”). 
74. 3 KOCH, supra note 12, § 8:27. 
75. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 35 n.226. 
76. See, e.g., Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. 11-1310-SC, 2011 WL 5038500, at *1  
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011). 
77. Bar MK Ranches, 994 F.2d at 740. 
78. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA, 
2017 WL 4642324, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017); Pitman v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 
No. 2:17-cv-00166-CW-EJF, 2018 BL 234618, at *4 (D. Ut. July 2, 2018). 
79. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2017 WL 4642324, at *3; Pitman, 2018 BL 234618, at *4. 
80. See, e.g., Silver State Land, LLC v. Beaudreau, 59 F. Supp. 3d 158, 161 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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them.81 Courts have recognized various exceptions to the record rule where 
informal agency action is at issue, including where: (1) the plaintiff makes a showing 
of bad faith or improper behavior;82 (2) the agency failed to consider relevant 
factors;83 (3) background information is necessary to help the court understand a 
technical issue;84 and (4) the record is so incomplete as to frustrate judicial review.85 
These circumstances may also justify discovery.86 As a rule, the exceptions to the 
record rule are narrowly applied.87 
The completion/supplementation dichotomy is a straightforward way of 
characterizing disputes over an administrative record’s contents. It allows for a 
distinction between materials that should be considered because they were properly 
a part of the administrative record from the beginning (in the case of completion) 
and materials that are not properly part of the record but may be considered 
nonetheless (in the case of supplementation). However, I should note that although 
the mechanisms and process for disputing an administrative record are generally 
consistent, this vernacular is not consistently used, as some courts and 
commentators have lamented.88 This terminological inconsistency serves as a bit of 
an appetizer for the broader confusion regarding what an agency is obliged to 
include in the administrative record for informal agency action. Nevertheless, in the 
 
81. See generally Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the 
Record in Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333 (1984).  
82. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 420 
(1971); Animal Def. Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1988), amended, 867 F.2d 1244 
(9th Cir. 1989) (“Courts may inquire outside the agency record when plaintiffs make a showing of 
agency bad faith. For this exception to apply, ‘[n]ormally there must be a strong showing of bad faith 
or improper behavior before the court may inquire into the thought processes of administrative 
decisionmakers.’”) (citation omitted). 
83. See 3 KOCH, supra note 12, § 8:27 (“The ‘relevant factors’ ground for supplementation comes 
into play where a party seeks to demonstrate that an agency decision was arbitrary because the agency 
did not consider some important aspect of the regulatory problem before it.”). In some cases, this 
would be grounds for completing the record, if materials before the agency showed the relevant factor, 
but it is an appropriate ground for supplementation where the material was not before the agency. 
84. See Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 n.166 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (collecting cases). 
85. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. Courts sometimes allow parties to “supplement” the 
record with documents the agency in fact “relied” on in coming to its decision but that were not 
included in the certified administrative record. See, e.g., Friends of the Payette v. Horseshoe Bend 
Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 1993). However, adding such documents to the 
administrative record is more properly understood as “completion” as they should always have been a 
part of the record. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 31–35. Conflating completion with 
supplementation glosses over the distinction between materials considered by the agency and materials 
not considered by the agency, which nevertheless may be relevant for judicial review. See id. 
86. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420; Hodel, 840 F.2d at 1437. 
87. See, e.g., Citizens for Alts. to Radioactive Dumping v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 485 F.3d 1091, 
1096 (10th Cir. 2007) (“It is only in ‘extremely limited circumstances, such as where the agency ignored 
relevant factors it should have considered or considered factors left out of the formal record’ that we 
will consider extra-record evidence.”). 
88. See Water Supply & Storage Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 910 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1261 n.4  
(D. Colo. 2012); Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 31–35, 64; James N. Saul, Comment, Overly Restrictive 
Records and the Frustration of Judicial Review, 38 ENVIR. L. 1301, 1319–20 (2008). 
First to Printer_Alter.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/30/20  4:15 PM 
2020] A RECORD OF WHAT? 1059 
interest of relying on the most precise vocabulary available, I adopt the  
completion/supplementation distinction for the purposes of this Note.89 
B. The Early History of the Record Rule 
Courts appear to have applied a rudimentary version of the record rule in 
reviewing agency action before the Congress enacted the APA in 1946, which 
limited judicial review to the record the subject agency action was based on and 
typically prevented the parties from conducting discovery.90 However, there is 
limited case law as to the scope of this pre-APA record rule due perhaps in part to 
the relatively limited role of federal agencies before the New Deal.91 
Enacted in 1946, the APA limits judicial review of agency action to the “the 
whole record, or those parts of it cited by a party.”92 However, the significant 
legislative history surrounding the APA provides only a cursory mention of the 
“whole record” requirement.93 For formal adjudications and formal rulemakings, 
the APA defines the administrative record as “[t]he transcript of testimony and 
exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding.”94 Indeed, 
the APA’s formal rulemaking and adjudication procedures serve in part to create a 
well-defined administrative record for judicial review.95 However, the APA 
provides no such guidance for informal agency action, which left open the 
possibility that courts would review informal agency action based on evidence 
presented in the first instance to the reviewing court.96 The Supreme Court rejected 
this possibility in Overton Park, the seminal case regarding the application of the 
record rule to informal agency action.97 Indeed, what limited legislative history exists 
 
89. See generally Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 31–35 (doing the same); Saul, supra note 88,  
at 1319–20. 
90. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (“Such an examination of a judge 
would be destructive of judicial responsibility. We have explicitly held . . . that it was not the function 
of the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary. Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such 
a scrutiny, so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected.”) (internal quotation 
and citations omitted); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 443 (1930) (“The validity 
of an order of the Secretary, like that of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, must be 
determined upon the record of the proceedings before him . . . .”). But see Cincinnati, New Orleans  
& T.P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 162 U.S. 184, 196 (1896) (“We do not mean, of course, 
that either party, in a trial in the court, is to be restricted to the evidence that was before the commission, 
but that the purposes of the act call for a full inquiry by the commission into all the circumstances and 
conditions pertinent to the questions involved.”). 
91.  See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 14–18. 
92. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
93. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 18–20 (theorizing this may have been because of stricter 
standing requirements at the time). 
94. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2012). 
95. See 3 KOCH, supra note 12, § 8:27; Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 12.  
96. See 3 KOCH supra note 12, § 8:27 (“One possible judicial response to the absence of any 
statutory definition of the “record” for informal proceedings would be to regard them, simply, as  
non-record proceedings. On this approach, an agency attempting to defend its action during judicial 
review would not be bound by a record it created during its own proceedings.”) 
97. See id. 
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regarding the record rule suggests its drafters intended the record rule to apply to 
all forms of agency action.98 
The Supreme Court first addressed the record rule in Overton Park. In that 
case, various local and national stakeholders challenged the Secretary of 
Transportation’s authorization of federal funding for the construction of a six-lane 
highway through Overton Park, a 342-acre public park in Memphis, Tennessee.99 
Under the relevant statutes, the Secretary could only approve funding for the project 
if “‘no feasible and prudent’” route around the park existed and there had been “‘all 
possible planning to minimize harm to the park.’”100 In the district court, the agency 
presented affidavits from the Secretary, which indicated that his decision could be 
supported by the relevant facts.101 The Court found these “post-hoc 
rationalizations” to be an “inadequate basis for [judicial] review.”102 Rather, the 
Court concluded that judicial review under the APA’s record rule “is to be based on 
the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his 
decision,” not evidence presented to the reviewing court in the first instance.103 This 
statement now serves as the baseline rule for an administrative record.104 Because 
that record had not been presented, and had not been compiled in the process of 
the agency’s decision-making, the Court remanded to the district court for it to 
develop the administrative record without providing further guidance as to its 
proper scope.105 
In Camp v. Pitts, the Court re-affirmed that “the focal point for judicial review 
should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made 
initially in the reviewing court.”106 There, the Court considered the Comptroller of 
Currency’s rejection of the plaintiff’s application for authorization to organize a new 
bank in Hartsville, South Carolina.107 In rejecting the application, the Comptroller 
communicated the decision through a letter to the applicants, which the office 
reiterated in a second letter upon a request for reconsideration.108 The agency 
presented the two letters and associated documents that were part of the 
preparation of those letters as the administrative record in the district court.109 
Before the Court was the Fourth Circuit’s remand instruction, which envisioned the 
creation of an evidentiary record through a de novo hearing in front of the district 
court.110 The Court rejected that instruction, which it found to “put aside the 
 
98. See id. 
99. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 406 (1971). 
100. Id. at 404–06. 
101. Id. at 409. 
102. Id. at 419. 
103. Id. at 420. 
104. See supra Part II.C. 
105. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420–21. 
106. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). 
107. Id. at 138. 
108. Id. at 138–39. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 140. 
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extensive administrative record already made and presented to the [district] 
court.”111 Rather, the Court remanded to the Fourth Circuit for further 
consideration, advising that if the court of appeal found that the proffered 
administrative record could not support the Comptroller’s decision, the proper 
action was to vacate that decision and remand to the agency for  
further consideration.112 
C. The Current State of the Record Rule 
Taken together, Overton Park and Camp clarify some aspects of the record rule 
as applied to informal agency action. First, the record rule does in fact apply to 
informal agency action.113 Second, judicial review must focus on the record in 
existence at the time of the decision.114 Third, discovery beyond the administrative 
record is disfavored but allowed at least where there is no record for judicial review 
to consider.115 Fourth, where the administrative record does not support a decision, 
the proper judicial action is to vacate the action and remand to the agency for  
further consideration.116 
Lower courts have since found common ground on other rules for the 
administrative record’s scope. Courts today generally agree the administrative 
record should not be limited to those materials directly considered by the agency 
decisionmaker.117 Rather, lower courts generally agree that an administrative record 
should include materials considered by subordinates involved in the ultimate 
decision.118 This, however, is where the consensus ends, and the inconsistency 
begins. Moreover, as the DACA litigation and Department of Commerce illustrate, the 
government has recently insisted that the administrative record need not include 
anything more than what passed before the ultimate decisionmaker’s eyes, reverting 
to a particularly narrow version of the record rule.119 
 
111. Id. at 142. 
112. Id. at 142–43. 
113. See 3 KOCH, supra note 12, § 8:27. 
114. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971). 
115. Id. at 420. 
116. Id.; Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). 
117. See Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The whole 
administrative record, therefore, consists of all documents and materials directly or indirectly considered 
by agency decision-makers and includes evidence contrary to the agency’s position.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 638 F.2d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 1980); Nat’l Courier 
Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“The proper 
approach, therefore, would appear to be to consider any document that might have influenced the 
agency’s decision . . . .”); Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1275  
(D. Colo. 2010) (“If the agency decision maker based his decision on the work and recommendations 
of subordinates, those materials should be included in the record.”); Clairton Sportsmen’s Club  
v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 882 F. Supp. 455, 465 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (“A document need not literally pass before 
the eyes of the final agency decisionmaker to be considered part of the administrative record.”). 
118. See cases cited supra note 117. But see Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 1161, 1181 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d in part, and rev’d in part, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982). 
119. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA, 2017 
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The APA’s reference to the “whole record,”120 and Overton Park’s insistence on 
the “full administrative record”121 before the agency suggest a broad application of 
the record rule for informal agency action. This, however, has rarely been the case. 
Indeed, lower courts faced with motions to complete an administrative record in 
such cases traditionally insisted on a narrow scope, generally excluding internal 
materials, especially communications, from the proper scope of an administrative 
record.122 This is consistent with some agency guidance for compiling an 
administrative record, which excludes most materials (such as emails, notes, drafts, 
and other informal materials) outside of formalized final agency documents.123 
More recently, some lower courts have begun to buck the traditional approach 
and grant broad orders to complete the administrative record with not just specific 
documents identified by the parties but also entire categories of excluded materials, 
including “internal comments, draft reports, inter- or intra-agency emails, revisions, 
memoranda, or meeting notes [that] inform an agency’s final decision” along with 
privilege logs documenting any assertions of deliberative process, attorney/client, 
or other privilege.124 These courts may find the agency’s initially certified record 
incomplete on the basis of the agency’s use of an overly narrow definition of what 
constitutes the “whole record” or on the basis of documents presented by the 
plaintiff, or a combination of both factors.125 The DACA case and Department of 
Commerce provide two of the most noteworthy illustrations. 
In the DACA litigation, the University of California, among others, alleged 
that then-Acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke’s decision to revoke DACA was 
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.126 DHS then certified an 
administrative record that “consisted of fourteen documents spanning 256 pages, 
 
WL 4642324, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017); Transcript of Oral Argument at 81, New York v. Dep’t 
of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-02921). 
120. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (emphasis added). 
121. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added). 
122. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 
26, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc); ASSE Int’l, Inc. v. Kerry, No. SACV 14-00534-CJC-( JPRx), 2018 
WL 3326687, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2018); Coastal Conservation Ass’n v. Locke,  
No. 2:09-cv-641-FtM-29SPC, 2010 WL 1439071, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2010) (citing Moye, O’Brien, 
O’Rourke, Hogan & Prickert v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 376 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004)); 
Amfac Resorts, L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 143 F. Supp. 2d 7, 13 (D.D.C. 2001) (“[D]eliberative 
intra-agency memoranda and other such records . . . need not be included in the record.”) (citing In re 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Office of Comptroller of Currency, 156 F.3d 1279, 1280  
(D.C. Cir. 1998); Madison County Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 622 F.2d 393, 
395 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980); Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 331 (2d Cir. 1977)); 
Richard McMillan, Jr. & Todd D. Peterson, The Permissible Scope of Hearings, Discovery, and Additional  
Fact-Finding During Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action, 1982 DUKE L.J. 333, 342 (1982). 
123. Saul, supra note 88, at 1314–19; see Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 11–13. 
124. Inst. for Fisheries Res. v. Burwell, No. 16-cv-01574-VC, 2017 WL 89003, at *1; see also 
cases cited supra note 16. 
125. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA, 
2017 WL 4642324, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017); Department of Commerce, Oral Ruling on 
Administrative Record, Docket No. 205 at 81 ( July 20, 2018). 
126. See supra note 1. 
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each of which was already available to the public.”127 Plaintiffs moved for 
completion of the administrative record, arguing that it (1) only contained 
documents directly considered by Acting Secretary Duke, improperly excluding 
indirectly considered documents and (2) did not even include all of the documents 
Acting Secretary Duke herself considered.128 DHS opposed the motion, arguing 
that an administrative record is properly limited to those unprivileged materials 
directly considered by the decisionmaker.129 Judge Alsup ordered DHS to complete 
the administrative record and provide a privilege log for any documents withheld 
based on an assertion of privilege.130 Specifically, Judge Alsup ordered DHS to  
complete the administrative record by adding to it all emails, letters, 
memoranda, notes, media items, opinions and other materials directly or 
indirectly considered in the final agency decision to rescind DACA, to the 
following extent: (1) all materials actually seen or considered, however 
briefly, by Acting Secretary Duke in connection with the potential or actual 
decision to rescind DACA (except as stated in the next paragraph below), 
(2) all DACA-related materials considered by persons (anywhere in the 
government) who thereafter provided Acting Secretary Duke with written 
advice or input regarding the actual or potential rescission of DACA, (3) 
all DACA-related materials considered by persons (anywhere in the 
government) who thereafter provided Acting Secretary Duke with verbal 
input regarding the actual or potential rescission of DACA, (4) all 
comments and questions propounded by Acting Secretary Duke to 
advisors or subordinates or others regarding the actual or potential 
rescission of DACA and their responses, and (5) all materials directly or 
indirectly considered by former Secretary of DHS John Kelly leading to his 
February 2017 memorandum not to rescind DACA.131 
This order came prior to Judge Alsup ruling on DHS’s pending motion to 
dismiss, which could have rendered the need for an administrative record moot.132 
The Ninth Circuit, in a split decision ruling on the government’s petition for 
a writ of mandamus, found no clear error in Judge Alsup’s order: “Put bluntly, the 
notion that the head of a United States agency would decide to terminate a program 
giving legal protections to roughly 800,000 people based solely on 256 pages of 
publicly available documents is not credible, as the district court concluded.”133 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court did not address the administrative record issue directly. 
Rather, in a per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that the district court should have 
granted the government’s earlier motion to stay completion of the record until it 
 
127. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA, 2017 WL 
4642324, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at *9–10. 
131. Id. 
132. See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443, 445 (2017). 
133. In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017) (footnotes omitted), cert. granted, 
and judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017). 
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ruled on the government’s motion to dismiss, vacating the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
and remanding for further proceedings.134 However, the Court acknowledged “[t]he 
Government makes serious arguments that at least portions of the District Court’s 
order are overly broad,” referring to the order to complete the administrative 
record.135 Justice Breyer, joined by the Court’s other liberal justices, dissented from 
an earlier stay pending review, finding no error in Judge Alsup’s order.136 On 
remand, the district court denied the government’s two motions to dismiss as to 
plaintiff’s claims that the decision to rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious in 
violation of the APA.137 In a subsequent order, Judge Alsup doubled down on his 
construction of the record rule and required the government to complete the 
administrative record in a manner substantially the same as he had previously, 
narrowing the order only so far as to limit it to materials held by the agency (as 
opposed to materials held by the White House) among a few other marginal 
changes.138 The Ninth Circuit upheld Judge Alsup’s ruling on the government’s 
motion to dismiss,139 and the government has petitioned the Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari on the issue, leaving open the question of what the “whole record” 
for the DACA litigation will ultimately consist of. 
In Department of Commerce, various states, municipalities, and other 
stakeholders brought suit alleging that Secretary of Commerce Wilber Ross’s 
decision to add a citizenship status question to the 2020 Census was arbitrary and 
capricious in violation of the APA.140 Commerce then certified an administrative 
record that, like DHS’s first certified record in the DACA litigation, only contained 
documents Secretary Ross considered directly.141 Moreover, the record began with 
a Department of Justice memorandum to Commerce supporting the addition of the 
citizenship question, which Secretary Ross had claimed publicly to be the impetus 
for adding the citizenship question.142 Plaintiffs moved for completion of the 
record, arguing Commerce’s first certified record was incomplete (1) for its failure 
to include materials the Secretary considered indirectly—i.e. materials his 
subordinates considered before advising the Secretary—and (2) because emails and 
 
134. See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. at 445. 
135. Id. 
136. In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 374 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
137. Regents of Univ. of Cal. V. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1049–50 
(N.D. Cal. 2018). 
138. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA, 2018 
WL 1210551, at *8–12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018). 
139. See generally Regents of Univ. of Cal. V. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (government’s first motion to dismiss), aff’d sub nom.; Regents of the  
Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018); Regents of  
Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(government’s second motion to dismiss), aff’d sub nom.; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018). 
140. See Complaint, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 1:18-cv-02921  
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2018). 
141. See id. 
142. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 530–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
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other correspondence plaintiffs had obtained through Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA)143 requests demonstrated the decision-making process in fact begun well 
before the Justice memoranda.144 Ruling from the bench, Judge Furman granted 
plaintiffs’ motion to complete the administrative record.145 But rather than provide 
a detailed order as Judge Alsup did in the DACA litigation, Judge Furman simply 
directed Commerce to complete the record on the bases of the deficiencies 
identified by the plaintiffs and provide a privilege log for any documents withheld 
on the basis of an assertion of privilege.146 However, Judge Furman implicitly 
adopted a broad reading of the record rule consistent with that from the DACA 
litigation, given that much of plaintiff’s proffered FOIA materials—the basis of the 
completed record—were the same sorts of internal, informal documents (emails, 
drafts, etc.) referenced in Judge Alsup’s order.147 
Much of the subsequent procedural disputes in Department of Commerce, 
centered around Judge Furman’s concurrent order allowing plaintiffs to depose 
Secretary Ross and certain of his subordinates.148 But, for our purposes, it is enough 
to note that Judge Furman, following a bench trial, ultimately rendered a verdict 
that Secretary Ross’s decision to a citizenship question to the 2020 Census was 
arbitrary and capricious, taking pains to demonstrate that the administrative record 
alone supported his decision, without reference to any extra-record evidence.149 The 
government appealed this decision directly to the Supreme Court, which upheld it, 
holding that Secretary Ross’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 
Census was arbitrary and capricious because it rested on a pretextual justification 
contrived to disguise the agency’s actual reason for wishing to add the question.150 
As to the issue of the administrative record, the Court again refused to delineate the 
appropriate boundaries of an administrative record for informal agency action, 
repeatedly emphasizing that the 12,000 odd documents the government added to 
their original record were added by stipulation of the parties.151 And unlike the lower 
court, the Supreme Court based its conclusion on the entire record, including the 
extra-record discovery and deposition testimony that had been admitted.152 Thus, 
the Court left unsettled the appropriate scope of the administrative record for lower 
courts and commentators alike to debate.153 
 
143. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
144. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 530. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
147. See id. 
148. See, e.g., In re Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. 16, 16–18 (2018). 
149. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 514–19, 660. 
150. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, No. 18-966, slip op. at 28–29 (S. Ct. June 27, 2019). 
151. Id. at 7, 25. 
152. Id. at 25–26. 
153. Id. at 25. There are a few nuggets of dicta that could be mined to glean a suggestion of the 
Court’s leanings on the matter. On the one hand, the Court acknowledged that when Judge Furman 
ordered the government to complete the administrative record while simultaneously authorizing  
extra-record discovery, “the most that was warranted was an order to complete the administrative 
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Part of that debate is the larger movement in the lower courts towards a broad 
definition of the record rule for APA challenges of informal agency action, which 
the DACA litigation and Department of Commerce are representative of.154 As I argue 
in the next Part, this broad application of the record rule is necessary for meaningful 
judicial review of whether the informal agency action is the product of the agency’s 
reasoned decision-making, and desirable in terms of the administrative law 
principles that motivated the APA’s adoption and subsequent interpretation. 
III. THE “WHOLE RECORD” FOR INFORMAL AGENCY ACTION 
The record rule and the concept of an administrative record derive from the 
APA’s requirement that judicial review of agency action, even informal agency 
action, be based on the “whole record.”155 The traditional approach to the record 
rule limits judicial review of informal agency action to only those materials directly 
 
record.” Id. But this does not indicate that the Court agreed with the extent of the completion that came 
about. On the other hand, the Court remarked without elaboration that “[i]t is rare to review a record 
as extensive as the one before us when evaluating informal agency action—and it should be.” Id. at 28. 
But this statement does not specify the “administrative record” and is likely attributable to the Court’s 
stated issues with the timing of Judge Furman’s discovery orders, which contributed to the larger 
“record” for review. See id. at 25. In short, the Court dashed the hopes of anyone hoping it would take 
the opportunity in Department of Commerce to clarify the scope of an administrative record for informal 
agency action. See, e.g., Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 25, 76–77. 
154. See Saul, supra note 88, at 1314–19; see also Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 11–13. There 
has been relatively little academic commentary on the proper scope of an administrative record, 
although the issue has received some attention in recent years, with limited arguments for and against 
a narrow or expansive approach to the record rule. On the one hand, Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, 
represent a modern “strict” approach to the record rule, which adheres more closely to what I describe 
as the “traditional” approach to the record rule. Gavoor and Platt acknowledge that an administrative 
record should include materials considered by agency staffers involved in the decision-making process, 
not simply materials considered by the ultimate decisionmaker. Id. at 33. However, they would 
apparently categorically exclude “deliberative” pre-decision documents, regardless of whether they are 
formally privileged. Id. at 39 (“Because these materials do not belong in the record in the first place, no 
log is required for deliberative-process material not included in the administrative record. In other 
words, whether the deliberative-process material is privileged is irrelevant. A court may prefer to review 
the withheld or redacted information in camera to ensure it is properly outside the scope of the record 
(e.g., deliberative process) or properly privileged. A court may also require the government file the 
unredacted version under seal.”) (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, Saul, supra note 88, at  
126–29, argues in favor of an expansive definition of the administrative record. I build on Saul’s 
argument by specifically approaching the issue in terms of the sorts of documents that inform arbitrary 
and capricious review, providing a complimentary analysis informed by subsequent case law of why an 
expansive definition of the record rule is necessary for meaningful arbitrary and capricious review. 
Recent work by Professor Michael Ray Harris also provides insight into the debate. See Michael Ray 
Harris, Standing in the Way of Judicial Review: Assertion of the Deliberative Process Privilege in APA 
Cases, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 349 (2009). Harris’s contention is that overly broad assertions of deliberative 
process privilege frustrate APA review by depriving the reviewing court of materials of fundamental 
relevance to the arbitrary and capricious inquiry. Id. at 353, 386. As Harris’s focus is more narrow—on 
assertions of privilege, not the place of deliberative documents writ large, whether or not privileged or 
claimed to be—he does not directly contend that deliberative and communicative internal documents 
should be categorically included in administrative records, subject to a justified assertion of privilege, 
as I do here. Id. 
155. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
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considered by the agency decisionmaker and categorically excludes most, if not all, 
internal documents and communications from the administrative record.156 
Recently, some lower courts have adopted a more expansive approach to the record 
rule, requiring that an administrative record of informal agency action include 
materials considered by agency personnel involved in the decision-making process 
beyond the decisionmaker, and categorically including internal materials subject to 
a justified claim of privilege by the agency.157 
In this Part, I contend that the expansive approach is the better interpretation 
of the APA’s “whole record” requirement for two reasons. First, the expansive 
approach better enables courts reviewing informal agency action to engage in the 
“thorough, probing, in-depth review” of the agency’s decision-making mandated by 
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.158 Second, the expansive approach 
comports with the fundamental principles of administrative law that underlie the 
APA. I conclude this Part by rebutting the most common critiques of the  
expansive approach. 
A. The Record Rule and Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Overton Park serves as a baseline for the record rule as it applies to informal 
agency action. Under Overton Park, the administrative record includes only those 
materials (a) “before” the agency (b) at the time of its decision.159 Both the narrow 
and the expansive approach to the record rule acknowledge these limitations, which 
properly keep the reviewing court’s focus on the agency’s actual decision-making 
process, not advantageous post-hoc rationalizations or materials the agency never 
considered.160 But Overton Park is unclear as to what it means for material to be  
“before” the agency. This leads to the two areas of dispute in record rule 
jurisprudence: (1) whether an administrative record should include any material 
considered by personnel involved in the decision-making process or only the 
decisionmaker; and (2) what types of materials should be a part of the “whole” 
administrative record—i.e., whether and to what extent an administrative record 
should include internal documents. In what follows, I address each issue, arguing at 
both turns that the expansive approach to the record rule better enables the 
 
156. See cases cited supra, note 122; Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 1161, 1181  
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d in part, and rev’d in part, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982). 
157. See cases cited supra note 16. 
158. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 406 (1971). 
159. Id. at 420. 
160. Of course, in some cases an agency action will be arbitrary and capricious because of the 
agency’s failure to account for an important aspect of the problem at issue. Much of the time, the 
administrative record properly constructed will contain the evidence of such a failing. For example, 
where a public comment raises an important issue that the agency fails to address, that comment is 
appropriately part of the record because it was at some point considered by the agency. In more 
uncommon circumstances, where the agency failed to even consider an important issue, 
supplementation, not completion, of the record is the appropriate course. 
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reviewing court to engage in meaningful judicial review under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard. 
1. Materials before whom? 
Put simply, an administrative record for informal agency action must include 
materials considered by all agency personnel involved in the decision-making 
process—not just the ultimate decisionmaker—because this is the only way to 
capture the intricacy of modern administrative decision-making, which is the 
product of complex bureaucratic institutions.161 This position is not particularly 
controversial—lower courts, even if they apply a narrow approach to the record 
rule in another respect, today generally agree that an administrative record should 
include materials considered by any agency personnel involved in the  
decision-making process.162 But the issue is worth addressing in light of the Trump 
Administration’s recent insistence, in the DACA litigation and Department of 
Commerce, that an administrative record should be limited to only those materials 
directly considered by the ultimate decisionmaker.163 
Including indirectly considered materials reflects the reality that limiting 
judicial review to only those materials directly considered by the ultimate 
decisionmaker would render the administrative record a “fictional account of the 
actual decisionmaking process.”164 Take, for example, the Department of the 
Interior, which employs over 70,000 people across nine bureaus and countless 
offices under the Secretary.165 One such bureau is the Bureau of Land Management, 
headed by a Director charged with permitting authority over an array of uses of 
federal land, such as rights-of-way for pipelines, railroads, or highways.166 Approval 
of these projects frequently requires the preparation of an environmental 
assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et  
seq. (2012) (NEPA), which the agency must take into account during the approval 
process.167 These reports can span thousands of pages.168 No one seriously suggests 
the ultimate decisionmaker has read these thousands of pages—rather, it is accepted 
that the decisionmaker relied on summaries prepared by subordinate staff or as part 
of the assessment itself. But nor does anyone seriously suggest that these whole 
 
161. See Saul, supra note 88. 
162. See sources cited supra note 117. But see Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 1161, 1181 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d in part, and rev’d in part, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982); McMillan & Peterson, supra 
note 122, at 342. 
163. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA, 2017 
WL 4642324 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017). 
164. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
165. Bureaus, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/bureaus [https://perma.cc/
QUY7-XKTS] ( last visited Feb. 10, 2020 ); Interior Offices, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/
bureaus/offices [https://perma.cc/UZM3-AJ6K] ( l ast visited Feb. 10, 2020 ). 
166. See generally Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1782 
(2012) (“FLPMA”); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012) (“NEPA”).  
167. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Jewell, 740 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2014). 
168. See id. 
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environmental assessments should not be in the record. Indeed, the underlying 
report is necessary to test the accuracy of the summary and/or the reasonableness 
of the ultimate decision. 
Limiting judicial review to only those materials considered directly to the 
agency decisionmaker would hobble arbitrary and capricious review. A construction 
of the record rule limiting judicial review to only those materials directly considered 
by the ultimate decisionmaker would create a gaping loophole for agencies to exploit 
by having subordinates submit only those materials supporting a favored course of 
action regardless of the contrary evidence. This would fundamentally undermine 
the concept of reasoned decision-making by turning agency action into an exercise 
in cherry-picking favorable evidence for presentation to the reviewing court. That 
possibility is inconsistent with Overton Park itself, which rejected the Secretary’s 
proffering of evidence favorable to his position at trial, calling instead for a review 
of all the evidence before the Secretary and implicitly rejecting any interpretation 
that would allow the Secretary to proffer only that material favorable to his position 
from that universe of materials.169 A record that is only those materials that support 
the agency action is in no sense the “whole record,” and courts have strongly 
rejected a construction of the record rule that would allow an agency to unilaterally 
decide the contents of an administrative record.170 Limiting judicial review to only 
those materials considered by the agency decisionmaker would functionally allow 
just that and thus cannot be correct. 
2. Should an administrative record include internal documents? 
The more controversial question is: which of those materials considered by 
agency personnel involved in the decision-making process are properly part of the 
administrative record? The narrow approach would categorically exclude most 
internal documents, functionally limiting judicial review to external sources 
consulted by the agency. The expansive approach categorically includes internal 
materials—emails, letters, memoranda, opinions, meeting notes, and the  
like—subject to a justified assertion of privilege. As I will explain, the expansive 
approach is desirable because it ensures materials directly relevant to the arbitrary 
and capricious decision-making inquiry will be made available to the reviewing 
court. The narrow construction is inappropriate because it categorically excludes 
documents relevant to the arbitrary and capricious inquiry. 
As discussed in Part I, agencies can fail arbitrary and capricious review in a 
variety of ways, including by offering post-hoc and pretextual rationalizations to 
justify the action in question, failing to consider important aspects of the problem 
 
169. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971). 
170. See, e.g., Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739 (10th Cir. 1993); see Saul, supra note 
88; Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the  
APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park’s Requirement of Judicial Review “On the 
Record,” 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 222 (1996). 
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addressed, or relying on improper factors deciding whether and how to act.171 A 
review of the case law demonstrates that internal materials are regularly relevant to 
that inquiry—validating the expansive approach, which better ensures such 
materials are part of the administrative record so that the reviewing court can engage 
in its “substantial inquiry” into whether the agency action at issue was the product 
of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.172 
A few examples illustrate the relevance and significance of internal documents 
to arbitrary and capricious review. Department of Commerce is itself an example of the 
role internal documents can play in arbitrary and capricious review.173 In Department 
of Commerce, emails between Secretary Ross and subordinate officials were evidence 
that the explanation provided for adding the 2020 Census citizenship question was 
a pretextual rationalization rendering the action arbitrary and capricious.174 Secretary 
Ross had contended that the decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 
Census was prompted by a December 2017 request to do so by the Department of 
Justice.175 But internal emails between the Secretary and other officials 
demonstrated that Commerce had prompted Justice to draft and send the request 
so that Commerce would have a reason for adding the question.176 Those emails 
indicated Commerce had been seeking such a request from other agencies but had 
been denied and repeatedly referenced the Secretary’s frustration that the question 
was taking so long to be added.177 Although the Supreme Court based its 
affirmation of this portion of the decision on the whole record, including  
extra-record discovery, after finding it warranted (if untimely),178 Judge Alsup 
specifically based his conclusion that the addition of a citizenship question violated 
the APA and was arbitrary and capricious on the administrative record alone, 
demonstrating the importance of those internal documents.179 
In another example, Earth Island Institute, the Ninth Circuit invalidated as 
arbitrary and capricious another Department of Commerce action finding that 
purse seine tuna fishing180 had no significant adverse impact on dolphin 
 
171. See, e.g., Bar MK Ranches, 994 F.2d at 739; see Saul, supra note 88; Young, supra note 170. 
172. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Gutierrez, No. C 01-0421 JL, 2008 WL 11358008, at *4  
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2008). 
173. The DACA litigation may likewise prove an example, but remains on appeal at the motion 
to dismiss stage and so the lower court is yet to apply arbitrary and capricious review to the  
underlying record. 
174. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); see also 
State v. Ross, 358 F. Supp. 3d 965, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
175. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 660–62. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, No. 18-966, slip op. at 25–26 (S. Ct. June 27, 2019). 
179. Judge Alsup then bolstered the conclusion with extra-record evidence. Dep’t of Commerce, 
351 F. Supp. 3d at 661. 
180. Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123 (2007). Tuna will sometimes swim under 
dolphin pods—purse seine fishing involves encircling the tuna and dolphin with the aim of harvesting 
the tuna and releasing the dolphins. Id. at 1126–27. 
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populations.181 Congress had delegated the inquiry to Commerce, requiring it to 
collaborate with other agencies and review the best available science to make the 
finding, which would trigger certain labeling requirements.182 Specifically, a finding 
of no adverse impact would allow tuna caught using the method to be labeled as 
“dolphin-safe,” which had significant economic implications for producers.183 The 
Ninth Circuit relied on various internal materials to find that the policy was the 
result of improper political and foreign affairs concerns—“factors Congress had 
not intended it to consider”—and therefore arbitrary and capricious.184 Those 
materials included: (1) an internal memorandum and briefing materials referencing 
the government of Mexico’s desire to have tuna caught with the method labeled as 
“dolphin-safe”; (2) various internal communications regarding the foreign policy 
issues related to the labeling; (3) changing drafts of internal memoranda around the 
time of the most significant political pressures, which retreated from claims that the 
available data did not support a finding of no adverse impact, emphasizing foreign 
policy issues instead.185 
Similarly, in Native Village of Point Hope v. Jewell, the Ninth Circuit invalidated 
an environmental assessment as arbitrary and capricious, relying on internal emails 
to do so.186 The case involved an environmental assessment conducted by the 
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) in the 
process of approving oil and gas development leases off the coast of Alaska.187 
Under NEPA, the agency was required to consider various alternatives discussed in 
the environmental assessment before making the decision to lease (or how much to 
lease).188 The BOEM recommended the Interior choose the more expansive leasing 
option based on environmental data premised on an estimate that in the event oil 
and gas development occurred, one billion barrels of oil would become 
economically recoverable.189 However, internal emails revealed that the one billion 
barrel estimate was chosen without an adequate scientific basis and was, as one 
 
181. Id. at 1128. 
182. Id. at 1127. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 1129, 1134–35; see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm  
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1983). It is perhaps not a surprise that a number of the cases 
referenced herein involve a degree of political intrigue. For a discussion of the appropriate place for 
political concerns in arbitrary and capricious review, see generally Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place 
for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009). 
185.  Earth Island Inst., 484 F.3d at 1129, 1134–35. The lower court relied on internal 
documents to find Commerce’s “no adverse impact” finding arbitrary and capricious for another 
reason. Specifically, it relied in part on an internal email raising concerns regarding the reliability of 
certain relevant data to find that the agency failed to rely on the “best available science” as required by 
the statutory scheme. Earth Island Inst. v. Evans, 26 I.T.R.D. 1993, *22 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d as 
modified sub nom. Earth Island Inst., 484 F.3d 1123. The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s 
conclusion but did not reference the same internal documents. Earth Island Inst., 484 F.3d at 1131. 
186. Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Jewell, 740 F.3d 489, 503–05 (9th Cir. 2014). 
187. Id. at 492. 
188. Id. at 492–94. 
189. Id. 
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agency scientist wrote, “entirely speculative,” and up to twelve billion gallons of oil 
could have been economically recoverable if prices remained steady.190 The court 
thus found the assessment arbitrary and capricious, remanding to the agency for 
further consideration using a reasoned estimate for the amount of oil likely to 
become economically recoverable.191 
Critically, a narrow construction of the record rule would have categorically 
excluded the crucial evidence in Department of Commerce, Point Hope, and Earth 
Island, and the various other cases decided based on internal documents,192 from 
the administrative record.193 This would place an extremely high burden on the 
plaintiff, who would have to argue for supplementation of the record under the 
extremely narrow exceptions to the record rule that warrant supplementation, 
drastically reducing the likelihood that the relevant material is available to the 
reviewing court. Thus, the expansive construction of the record rule is desirable 
because it better ensures internal materials relevant to the arbitrary and capricious 
inquiry are a part of the administrative record. 
B. The Record Rule and Principles of Administrative Law 
The expansive construction of the record rule for informal agency action also 
comports with the principles of administrative law at the heart of the APA. Broadly 
speaking, the APA represented a compromise between New Dealers, who called for 
a dramatically expanded role for administrative agencies in American government, 
and critics (including the American Bar Association) who were skeptical of the 
unchecked power agencies would enjoy under such a system.194 New Dealers 
justified their vision of the bureaucracy in terms of the need for expertise and 
flexibility: the modern world required complex solutions to new problems that 
required technical expertise and the ability to exercise flexible discretion that 
Congress lacked.195 Critics argued that administrative bureaucrats were politically 
unaccountable, insofar as they are not elected directly, and that, if unchecked, such 
 
190. Id. at 499–505. 
191. Id. at 505. 
192. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 638 F.2d 994, 1000–04 (7th Cir. 1980);  
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 372–73 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (relying on 
internal emails to find environmental assessment arbitrary and capricious for failing to consider relevant 
data); Wash. Toxics Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Fish & Wildlife Serv., 457 F. Supp. 2d 1158,  
1187–94 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (relying on internal correspondence conveying criticism of agency’s 
approach to find environmental assessment arbitrary and capricious for failing to consider  
relevant data). 
193. See generally Harris, supra note 154 at 393–409. Much of Harris’s argument that unwarranted 
assertions of privilege frustrate arbitrary and capricious review supports my broader contention that 
deliberative, yet non-privileged documents must be made part of the administrative record for judicial 
review to be meaningful. 
194. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 34–38 
(Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 8th ed. 2017); Harris, supra note 154, at 373–81 (2009); see generally Robert 
L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1267 (1986). 
195. See Harris, supra note 154, at 352. 
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a system would veil bureaucratic decision-making, rendering any indirect 
accountability through election of the president ineffective.196 Years of discussion 
on the matter resulted in the APA,197 which “sets forth the procedures by which 
federal agencies are accountable to the public and their actions subject to review by 
the courts.”198 Under this system, federal administrative agencies enjoyed the broad 
discretion necessary to address complex modern issues, but were held accountable 
through procedural requirements and judicial review that ensured their actions were 
truly the result of an application of their expertise.199 
The expansive construction of the record rule as applied to informal agency 
action comports with this history. First, the expansive construction serves to ensure 
agency action is, in fact, the product of agency expertise. Including internal 
documents such as memos, emails, drafts, meeting notes, etc. paints the most 
accurate picture possible of what motivated the agency’s decision, the factors it 
considered, and the analysis that went in to the ultimate decision. Where informal 
action at issue is the product of reasoned decision-making that applies agency 
expertise, an expansive administrative record will show so and serve to support the 
action. Where it is not, an expansive administrative record will demonstrate the 
agency failed to apply its expertise. In such cases, the justifications for agency 
discretion and flexibility are undermined and are to be corrected by judicial review. 
Critically, the result is not to foreclose the course of action, but to remand to the 
agency for further consideration. This ensures that the agency’s chosen course of 
action is not permanently foreclosed, but that if and when it is adopted it is adopted 
because it comports with the agency’s expertise and reasoned decision-making. 
Second, an expansive administrative record ensures agency officials and the 
Presidential Administrations they serve remain accountable to the public. An 
expansive administrative record provides the public with the most accurate picture 
of the agency’s decision-making, unveiling the agency’s policy motivations and its 
assessment of the issues. Where the administrative record reveals the agency’s 
decision is based on unpersuasive or unpopular reasoning, then the public can and 
should hold the agency accountable through the President even if the court does 
not invalidate the policy as arbitrary and capricious.200 But this accountability 
mechanism is undermined where the record rule is interpreted to allow the agency 
to present only favorable evidence or the most convenient rationales that shield its 
decision-making from public scrutiny. Various statutes involving administrative 
actions acknowledge the value inherent in agencies “showing their work,” even if 
 
196. See id. 
197.  See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950) (“The Act thus represents a long 
period of study and strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula 
upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest.”). 
198. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992); Regents of the  
Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 498–99 (9th Cir. 2018). 
199. See Harris, supra note 154, at 352–53. 
200. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
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doing so may not change the ultimate decision. NEPA, for example “ensures that 
the agency will inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental 
concerns in its decisionmaking process.”201 The disclosure may not change the 
ultimate action, but it does allow the public to hold an administration accountable 
for policy choices with damaging environmental consequences, or policy choices 
that place an unpopular environmental burden on commercial interests. 
As the D.C. Circuit remarked in analyzing the record rule: “Private parties and 
reviewing courts alike have a strong interest in fully knowing the basis and 
circumstances of an agency’s decision. The process by which the decision has been 
reached is often mysterious enough without the agency’s maintaining unnecessary 
secrecy.”202 The DACA litigation presents a case in point. There, DHS’s first 
certified record told a brief story about the rescission of a program it believed 
contrary to the governing law, a reasonably benign rationale.203 But the expansive 
record seems likely to expose a more complex, and more controversial reasoning 
related to the current administration’s broader immigration policies. An expansive 
approach to the record rule ultimately may not preclude the administration from 
rescinding DACA. But it would ensure the administration’s basis for rescinding the 
program are publicly acknowledged such that the public can hold the administration 
accountable for its choice in the forthcoming election.204 
C. Addressing Common Arguments Against an Expansive Record Rule 
Courts and commentators justify a narrow approach to the record rule in two 
ways: a narrow construction, the reasoning goes, (1) is more efficient, for agencies 
and reviewing courts; and (2) prevents judicial overreach beyond what is called for 
by arbitrary and capricious review.205 But these arguments overstate the impact 
wider adoption of an expansive approach to the record rule would have. Moreover, 
and perhaps more importantly, any limited impact is a worthwhile tradeoff for 
effective judicial review and the assurance agency action is the product of  
agency expertise. 
Efficiency concerns related to the expansive record rule are easily addressed 
or overblown. First, an expansive record rule is a reasonably bright line for courts 
 
201. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). 
202. Nat’l Courier Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1241  
(D.C. Cir. 1975). 
203. See In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 
S. Ct. 443 (2017). 
204. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 498–99 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (“But public accountability for agency action can only be achieved if the electorate knows 
how to apportion the praise for good measures and the blame for bad ones. Without knowing the true 
source of an objectionable agency action, ‘the public cannot “determine on whom the blame or the 
punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall.”’ In  
then-Professor Kagan’s words, ‘the degree to which the public can understand the sources and levers 
of bureaucratic action’ is ‘a fundamental precondition of accountability in administration.’”). 
205.  San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 26 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc); see, e.g., Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 69–71 (efficiency). 
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and litigants to apply and so wider adoption would result in more complete 
administrative records filed in the first instance, reducing the needs for courts to 
attend to motions to complete or supplement the record and narrowing the scope 
of such motions where they do come. True, the expansive approach would result in 
larger administrative records. But any burden on the courts can be resolved with 
reference to the APA itself, which allows for review of the “whole record or those 
parts of it cited by a party.”206 Where the administrative record is particularly large, 
the reviewing court is free to rely solely on those parts of the record cited by the 
parties, limiting the strain on the reviewing court. Moreover, agencies, courts, and 
litigants already navigate expansive records in a variety of contexts, as Justice Breyer 
recognized in his DACA dissent, such that any increased burden on the agency is 
speculative in light of existing procedures to deal with large records.207 In an age of 
electronic record-keeping, an agency need only conduct an electronic search for 
relevant documents and supplement that search with the more traditional gathering 
of documents that only exist in a hard copy. Indeed, the infrastructure for such a 
process already exists given agencies’ obligations to comply with FOIA requests.208 
As for concerns over judicial overreach, those fail to justify the gross 
overbreadth of a narrow construction of the record rule. Generally, these arguments 
assert that a narrow construction of the record rule is necessary to prevent the 
reviewing court from (1) replacing the agency’s expert policy choice with a policy 
choice preferred by the reviewing court; or (2) improperly inquiring into the mental 
processes of the agency decisionmaker.209 The first concern grants federal courts 
little respect. Even those lower courts that have applied an expansive construction 
of the record rule have properly limited their orders to those materials considered 
by the agency personnel.210 Moreover, those courts have been careful to clarify that 
their review was limited solely to the agency’s decision-making, not the merits of 
the underlying decision.211 There is little evidence that judicial overreach occurs, 
whatever the scope of the administrative record in question, and the Supreme Court 
as currently constituted would be sure to correct such an overreach. 
The second contends that internal documents are properly excluded from an 
administrative record because review of such materials would involve an 
 
206. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
207. See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 374–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
208. There is some question about how ingenuous these claims of burden on the agency truly 
are, given that administrative records already reach significant lengths. See In re United States, 138  
S. Ct. at 374 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Government complains that it must review 21,000 documents 
as potentially part of the administrative record. But . . . that is by no means an unusually large number 
of documents; administrative records often contain hundreds of thousands of documents.”). 
209. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 26 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc); see, e.g., Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts 
to Limit the Record in Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333 (1984). 
210. See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 518, 660–61  
(S.D.N.Y. 2019); see Young, supra note 170 (refuting the claim that courts regularly or inappropriately 
look beyond the administrative record). 
211. See, e.g., Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 518, 660–61; Young, supra note 170. 
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impermissible inquiry into the thought process of the decisionmaker, or are subject 
to deliberative process privilege.212 True, Overton Park compels a reviewing court to 
avoid inquiries into the mental processes of the agency decisionmaker outside of a 
narrow set of circumstances.213 But the case law suggests that this rule is properly 
limited to precluding literal transcripts of internal deliberations in addition to the 
depositions that were the Court’s focus in Overton Park.214 Moreover, as Justice 
Breyer emphasized in commenting on Judge Alsup’s expansive order to complete 
the record in the DACA litigation: “At least facially, these [internal] documents do 
not seem to involve ‘inquiry into the mental processes’ of the decisionmaker at 
all.”215 Similarly, the deliberative process privilege appears to apply  
narrowly—certainly, it did not preclude consideration of the relevant documents in 
Department of Commerce.216 To the extent it applies at all, 
it will normally be far easier for the agency to establish its interest in 
suppressing such documents than for the private litigants to establish their 
interest in exposing them to judicial scrutiny. The proper approach, 
therefore, would appear to be to consider any document that might have 
influenced the agency’s decision to be “evidence” . . . but subject to any 
privilege that the agency properly claims as protecting its interest in  
non-disclosure.217 
Given the narrow scope of materials that might reflect the decisionmaker’s 
mental processes and the breadth of internal materials directly relevant to the 
arbitrary and capricious inquiry, the narrow construction of the record rule is 
inappropriately overbroad. 
In sum, the expansive construction of the record rule illustrated by Department 
of Commerce and the DACA litigation is correct because it best enables a reviewing 
court to engage in the “thorough, probing, in-depth” arbitrary and capricious review 
of informal agency action mandated by the APA.218 The narrow construction is 
inappropriate because it would categorically exclude relevant material, undermining 
 
212. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 35–42. 
213. Citizens  to  Preserve  Overton  Park,  Inc.  v.  Volpe   (Overton  Park),  401  U.S.  402,  
420 (1971). 
214. See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 372 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To be sure, we also 
said in Overton Park . . . that ‘inquiry into the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers is 
usually to be avoided’ absent a showing of bad faith or improper conduct. But we said that in the 
context of explaining the circumstances under which officials ‘who participated in the decision’ could 
be required ‘to give testimony explaining their action.’”) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); In re 
United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Portland Audubon Soc’y, 984 F.2d at 1549); 
Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1549 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(distinguishing San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 26 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc)); S.F. Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,  
No. 16-cv-05420-RS( JCS), 2018 WL 3846002, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2018). 
215. In re United States, 138 S. Ct. at 373 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
216. See Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 547–72, 660–61. 
217. Nat’l Courier Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1241  
(D.C. Cir. 1975). 
218. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415. 
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judicial review of the agency’s decision-making process. Nor do concerns of judicial 
overreach and efficiency—which are speculative and easily addressed by the text of 
the APA—justify the narrow construction. 
CONCLUSION 
Fairly or unfairly, administrative law bears a reputation for being a bit 
tedious—boring, even.219 Perhaps that reputation is unavoidable given 
administrative law’s association with the nuances of obscure product labeling 
regulations and its various procedural intricacies.220 But as any first-year Civil 
Procedure professor worth their salt would say: “Procedure affects substance.” And 
when it comes to administrative law, the procedure affects the array of substantive 
areas federal agencies engage with: from immigration and healthcare, to 
employment and the environment. Thus, it would be a critical error for those 
involved in the myriad substantive fields touched by federal agencies to shy away 
from the procedural nuances of administrative law. 
With this Note, I have attempted to shed some light on the impact one of 
those procedural nuances—the composition of an administrative record for 
informal agency action—can have. Tedious or not (hopefully the latter so far as this 
Note is concerned), the issue can be of critical importance to parties litigating issues 
of national importance, as the DACA litigation and Department of Commerce illustrate. 
In shedding light on the issue, I have done my best to explain why an expansive 
approach to the record rule, which would have an administrative record of informal 
agency action include materials considered by any agency personnel involved in the 
decision-making process and categorically includes internal materials, is the 
desirable approach. First because it best enables a reviewing court to assess an 
agency’s decision-making under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious review, and 
second because it comports with the principles of administrative law the APA was 
designed to serve.221 The application of an expansive record rule ensures the 
ultimate decisions made by an agency are the product of reasoned decision-making 
and agency expertise, not the whims of political pressure, something more 
nefarious, or just plain laziness. 
 
219. See, e.g., The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations 
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989) (“[T]he subject of this lecture series is administrative law . . . so you 
should lean back, clutch the sides of your chairs, and steel yourselves for a pretty dull lecture.”); William 
Funk, My Ideal “Casebook” or What’s Wrong with Administrative Law Legal Education and How to Fix 
It, in A Nutshell (So to Speak), 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 247, 247 (2000) (“Administrative Law, the course, is 
commonly perceived as boring, technical, abstruse, not ‘real.’”). 
220. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123, 1126 (2007). 
221. See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (“[I]nterpret the relevant words 
not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context, structure . . . and purpose.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Of course, “[r]eliance on context and structure in statutory interpretation is 
a ‘subtle business, calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere rendering becomes creation 
and attempted interpretation of legislation becomes legislation itself.’” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 
2495–96 (2015) (quoting Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83 (1939)). But without definitive text 
or legislative history, context is the best available medium. 
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The expansive construction to the record rule has gained some momentum in 
the lower courts. But implementation of the expansive record rule thus far has been 
a piece-meal process, gaining traction only with its adoption in a few district courts 
in each successive opinion. Without some sort of intervention, it seems unlikely the 
expansive construction will be adopted uniformly. The question then, is what might 
be done to facilitate wider adoption of the record rule. The Supreme Court, as 
currently constituted, is unlikely to hold in favor of the rule, given its skepticism of 
Judge Alsup’s order in the DACA litigation. Legislative action is a more interesting 
proposition. Those on the right have espoused a profound skepticism in the leeway 
informal agency action enjoys and thus might be interested in clarifying the “whole 
record” requirement with an amendment of the APA.222 Those on the left, seeing 
what the Trump Administration has done with informal agency action, might also 
be inclined to seek a more expansive reading of the record rule, perhaps having faith 
that officials under their own administrations might be more faithful to the APA’s 
reasoned decision-making mandate. Perhaps that would be enough to overcome the 
legislative lethargy so characteristic of our modern Congress. Outside of those 
options, local rules might serve to speed the adoption of an expansive approach to 
the record rule.223 
Agency action, especial informal agency action, operates in the shadows of 
modern American life. But “[s]ecrecy, whether intentional or otherwise, is 
inconsistent ‘with fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due process and with 
the ideals of reasoned decision-making on the merits which undergirds all our 
administrative law.’”224 The broader adoption of an expansive construction of the 
record rule would serve to unveil the processes by which administrative agencies 
make decisions, big and small, assuring courts can hold agencies accountable where 
those decisions are not the product of reasoned decision-making, and the public can 
hold agencies accountable where those decisions are unpopular but within the 
agency’s discretion. The procedural nuances of the issue might be tedious, but the 
consequences are anything but. 
 
 
222. See, e.g., Attorney General Jeff Sessions Ends the Department’s Practice of Regulation by 
Guidance, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-
sessions-ends-department-s-practice-regulation-guidance [https://perma.cc/9WAD-HSZL]. 
223. Gavoor & Platt argue for this approach as a potential medium for ensuring the uniform 
application of a narrower record rule. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 6. 
224. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 638 F.2d 994, 1004 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting Home 
Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 111). 
